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Capital structure and earnings manipulation.
Abstract. We consider an optimal contract between an entrepreneur and
an investor, where the entrepreneur is subject to a double moral hazard prob-
lem (one being the choice of production e¤ort and the other being earnings
manipulation). Since the entrepreneur cannot entirely capture the results
of his e¤ort, investment is below the optimal level and production e¤ort is
socially ine¢ cient. The opportunity to manipulate earnings protects the en-
trepreneur against the risk of a low payo¤ when production is unsuccessful.
Ex-ante, this provides an incentive for the entrepreneur to increase invest-
ment and improve e¤ort.
Key words: earnings manipulation, intertemporal substitution, design of
securities, property rights, double moral hazard
JEL classication codes: G32, D92, D82
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1 Introduction
The corporate scandals of last decade have raised heated debates regarding
the earnings manipulations by rms insiders. Existing literature usually
focuses on earnings misreporting.1 In contrast, we consider earnings manip-
ulation (EM) to be a transfer of funds between periods. This transfer does
not create any social value (in contrast to productive e¤ort). EM can be con-
ducted by using either accounting methods (discretionary accruals) or real
actions.2 Some typical examples include delaying the approval of important
decisions, ine¢ cient investments, borrowing in order to manipulate nancial
results, ine¢ cient discount policy etc.3 Recent empirical papers on EM sug-
gest that the focus of research should be shifted from earnings misreporting
towards EM especially towards EM with real actions (Graham et al (2005),
Huang et al ( 2008)). In the present paper, we consider a model where EM
arises as a part of the equilibrium relationships between rmsinsiders and
outsiders. The model is able to generate several predictions regarding EM.
In their well-known paper Degeorge et al (1999) present a theoretical
model involving EM by a manager with a bonus-like contract. The authors
show that the managers incentive to manipulate earnings depends on the
values of the latent (pre-managed) earnings, the managers bonus, and the
magnitude of the social loss from EM. The managers decision also relies on
whether predictions of future prots are certain or risky.
In contrast, the model in the present paper contains a double-moral haz-
ard problem (one being the choice of production e¤ort and the other being
the EM decision). Second, we compare di¤erent contractual arrangements
1For empirical evidence about earnings misreporting see, among others, Dechow, Sloan
and Sweeney (1996) and Erickson, Hanlon and Maydew (2003). For theoretical papers see
Cornelli and Yoscha (2003), Crocker and Slemrod (2005) and Johnsen and Talley (2005).
2For accounting manipulations see, among others, Payne and Robb (1997) and
Burgstahler (1997). The latter considers a model where earnings are shifted via account-
ing methods with an assumption that marginal benets of higher earnings are large when
earnings are in middle range.
3Other examples include allowance for bad debt, cutting expenses on research and de-
velopment, managing pension plans, and delay in maintenance expenditures and other
important decisions (see Bartov (1993), Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser (1999), Roy-
chowdhury (2006) and Graham et al (2005)).
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between an investor and an entrepreneur as well as their impact on the entre-
preneurs e¤ort. This is important given that several recent papers analyze
the links between nancing structures and EM (see, for instance, Richard-
son et al (2007), Hodgson and Stevenson-Clarke (2000) and Jensen (2004)).
Finally, we compare the models predictions with EM and without EM. To
our knowledge there are not many papers analyzing the link between capi-
tal structure and EM. A notable exception is Trueman and Titman (1988).
The authors argue that EM can be used by managers to smooth earnings
and to improve the rms credit rating in order to obtain better conditions
for future debt nancing. In contrast, in our paper we analyze how existing
capital structure may a¤ect insidersincentives for EM.
We analyze a model where a rm needs external nancing. The rms
value consists of current (rst-period) earnings and the going concern value.
The nancing contract includes cash payments and an allocation of rights on
the rms going concern value - both being contingent on the magnitude of
the rms current earnings.4 The contract may a¤ect the value of the parties
cooperation because of the impact it has on the entrepreneurs incentives to
provide productive e¤ort and engage in EM. For instance, if the going concern
value represents a new rm and the party responsible for decision-making is
the sole owner of this new rm, this party will be interested in shifting the
value of the original business to the new rm (even if it is socially ine¢ cient).
As mentioned above, we compare two situations. In the rst, the entrepre-
neur chooses only a costly productive e¤ort - assuming that the entrepreneur
cannot be involved in EM. In the second, the entrepreneur is subject to a
double-moral hazard problem which includes the choice of productive e¤ort
and the EM decision. It is shown that the parties expected payo¤s can be
higher in the second case. The following demonstrates the intuitions behind
this result. Consider debt nancing. If current earnings are below the face
value of debt, the rm is bankrupt and the entrepreneur gets nothing. Since
the entrepreneurs e¤ort is costly, the socially optimal level of e¤ort in the
rst-period involves a trade-o¤ between the rms expected earnings in the
rst period and the cost of e¤ort. However, for the entrepreneur this trade-o¤
is biased (compared to the socially optimal level) because of bankruptcy risk.
In the case of bankruptcy, the entrepreneur loses a large amount of earnings
4See, among others, Kaplan and Stromberg (2003) for contingencies in nancing con-
tracts.
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in the second period which are not contractible.5 As a result, he will usually
provide a higher than socially optimal level of e¤ort. However, if he is able
to transfer earnings between periods, and the rms going concern value is
relatively high, the entrepreneur can increase current earnings by reducing
the rms going concern value. This allows the rm to avoid bankruptcy and
make a positive prot. This in turn increases his ex-ante incentive to provide
a socially optimal level of e¤ort. This argument works even if the cost of EM
is relatively high.
Graham et al (2005) recently found that EM via real activities manipu-
lation is used more frequently than accounting fraud and misreporting. The
management and prevention of EM becomes an important focus of an e¢ cient
corporate governance structure, rmsinvestors and government authorities.
The position of aforementioned parties depends primarily on whether they
are able to detect these manipulations and secondarily on their opinion of
whether these manipulations are useful or not. With regard to the former
note, Huang et al (2008) argue for example that Chinese regulation has been
successful because it is able to detect real manipulations. With regard to the
latter note, a possible strategy is to move in the direction of a zero-tolerance
policy via internal control, strict regulation and European style-corporate
governance codes. For example, a manager can be red or even charged
when found conducting business in such a way. This paper points out that
such a policy will not always lead to an improvement in production e¢ ciency
of corporations due to a double-moral hazard problem. The key is to un-
derstand the nature of managerial moral hazard which depends on rms
specic conditions including industrial conditions. If the rm operates in an
environment with a high degree of contract incompleteness, where long-term
projects and earnings are di¢ cult to verify by third parties, some degree of
earnings manipulation can be tolerable. On the other hand other industries
can denitely benet from zero-tolerance policy.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the
model; Section 3 explains optimal contracting without EM; Section 4 dis-
cusses optimal contracting when the entrepreneur is subject to a double moral
hazard problem which includes EM. A comparison of the outcomes is pre-
sented in Section 5. The case with a risk-averse entrepreneur is analyzed
in Section 6. Section 7 discusses the models robustness and possible exten-
sions. Section 8 discusses the models implications with regard to empirical
5Based on incomplete contracts literature (see, for example, Hart, 1995).
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evidence and Section 9 presents the conclusion.
2 Model
Consider a rm that has to make an investment b > 0. The rms owner/ent-
repreneur (E) needs external nancing from an outside investor (I). E and I
are risk neutral. If the investment is made, the rms performance depends
on Es e¤ort e 2 [0; 1]. The cost of e¤ort is e2. The interim rst-period cash
ow r0 equals 1 with probability e and 0 otherwise. The companys assets
which remain at the end of rst period may yield a revenue of 2 in the second
period.6 E may engage in EM. The rms nal rst-period prot is r = r0
 a, where a is a prot correction arising from intertemporal substitution
(EM takes place if a 6= 0). If a 6= 0, the rms going concern value at the end
of rst period is thus v = 2 + a   c, where c is the cost of EM, 0 < c < 2.7
EM is socially ine¢ cient (a = 0, where a denotes the socially optimal a).
To insure that earnings are non-negative in each period we assume that
c  2  a  r0 (1)
E observes r0 and chooses a. I cannot observe e and a. The rst-best level
of e¤ort e maximizes the rms expected value to the entrepreneur. The
expected value can be written as E[r+v e2  b] = e+2 e2  b. Obviously,
e = 1=2. We assume that the projects net present value is positive, i. e.
Ee=1=2;a=0[r + v   e2] = 9=4 > b (2)
The game is as follows:
1. Securities are issued and sold for an amount b. The investment is
made.
2. E chooses e.
3. r0 is realized, E chooses a.
6For simplicity it is assumed that the rms going concern value does not depend on e.
The model can easily be generalized by allowing this. As far as we can see, no intuitions
will be a¤ected by this change. The specic value is chosen arbitrarily although it assures
that the going-concern value of the rm is large enough compared to current earnings.
7The cost of EM includes mostly the time E spends on creating the "technology" for
EM (like creating a special purpose vehicle (rm) to hide losses in the case of Enron).
This is not necessarily linked to the magnitude of EM. The model can be generalized by
allowing di¤erent cost functions.
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4. r and v become known. The parties get their payo¤s according to the
securities issued.
A security is a contract between E and I that species payments to each
party in each scenario. When choosing which securities to issue, E maximizes
the expected value of his net earnings (payo¤on the securities minus the cost
of e¤ort). On the one hand, the contract should provide E with the optimal
incentive to choose e and a. On the other hand, the expected value of Is
payo¤must cover the investment cost, b, in order for I to accept the contract.
A complete contract contingent on the rms going concern value is im-
possible to write. This stems from the idea that the insiders have a larger
degree of freedom and they are more di¢ cult to control regarding long-term
projects than short-term projects.8 This intuition appears in Hart (1995,
p.23) and is based on the idea of impossibility to describe all states of nature
in the future. Obviously, this task is much more complicated in the long-
term than in the short-term. As a result of outsiders inability to control
the rms action in the long-term, the decision-maker can divert a fraction
of the rms value for his own interests. The managersactions which may
reduce/increase the rms value and increase/decrease the value of managers
benets are numerous. These include developing family business using rms
resources, giving a job to family members, disutility from working with un-
desirable but e¢ cient person, making subjective decisions regarding rms
investments in charity, advertising etc. An example of long-term projects
which have these problems are projects involving research. Since a research
result is extremely di¢ cult to control and to verify, the researcher can spend
time on working in the interests of another company or family interest instead
of focusing on rms shareholdersinterests.
Therefore we assume that E is not able to o¤er I a complete contract
contingent on the rms total value. As we discuss below, if this were possible,
the problem of EMwould not exist. The solution of the game described above
would be such that E will never manipulate earnings. This means a = 0.
Lemma 1. If complete contracts are possible, a = 0.
The proofs of all lemmas and propositions are put in the Appendix.
The intuition is following. EM does not increase the rms total value.
When the parties write a contract with payo¤s contingent on the rms total
8The model can be easily generalized by allowing some degree of discretion with regards
to short-term earnings as well or by allowing partial veriability of long-term earnings.
The results will hold as long as the degree of entrepreneurs capacity to steel long-term
earnings is higher than that in the short-term.
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value this will not provide an incentive for EM. Furthermore, for any contract
which is not contingent on the rms total value and that triggers EM by
E, a better contract exists which is contingent on rms total value. This
contract should pay E the same amount of earnings or slightly better as he
would earn under rst contract. Then E will chose the same level of e¤ort
but the overall payo¤ to the parties will be higher because it will not involve
EM.
3 Optimal contracting without earnings ma-
nipulation
A complete contract contingent on the rms going concern value is impos-
sible to write. Thus, we assume that E can only o¤er a complete contract
contingent on rst-period earnings r, and that E (the party in control) can
capture the rms going concern value (similar to Hart, 1988). E then re-
mains in control when the rm does not default. This leads to the following
security design in the model which depends on the rst-period sharing rule
and the contingencies for shifting control in the second period.9
Equity nancing (denote this strategy by s). In this case, I gets a fraction
k of the rms earnings in the rst period, 0 < k  1. Es payo¤ is (1 k)r+v
and Is payo¤ is kr.
Debt (denote this strategy by d). The rm issues debt with face value D
which matures at t = 1. If r < D (default), I gets the rst-period earnings
and the rms going concern value. E gets nothing. If r  D, Es rst-period
earnings are r D. He also obtains the rms going concern value. Therefore,
Es total payo¤ is r  D + v and Is total payo¤ is D.
Consider an optimal contract when E does not manipulate earnings under
any circumstance. This may be the case when the government puts in place a
well developed system of corporate controls, which makes it highly probable
that EM will be discovered. If the penalties for manipulating earnings are
very high, E cannot justify taking the risk. Es problem can be written as
9In Section 7 we discuss di¤erent security designs.
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follows (problem P1).
maxs;dEVE subject to
e = argmaxeEVE
0  e  1
EVI  b
where VE and VI denote the payo¤s of E and I respectively.
To solve P1 we will decompose it into two sub-problems. We rst consider
each nancing strategy separately and will summarize the results in Proposi-
tion 1. For strategy e, we expect that in cases when the rm undertakes the
project, Es e¤ort is below the rst-best level of e¤ort. This is because he
bears the full cost of the e¤ort while the results of the e¤ort must be shared
with I (in the spirit of Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
Lemma 2. 1) if b > 1=8, s is not feasible; 2) If b  1=8 and s is chosen,
e = (1  k)=2 (3)
k =
1 p1  8b
2
(4)
Intuitively, if b is too large, the fraction of equity that must be given
to I is large enough to prevent E from providing an e¤ort level which will
generate enough income to compensate I. The crucial point here is the
non-contractibility of second-period earnings. As a result, the investors pay-
o¤ relies heavily on the part of earnings that are veriable, that strongly
decreases Es incentive to provide a high e¤ort. By contrast, if earnings in
both periods are veriable, all projects with positive net-present values would
be undertaken. Also note that according to (3), Es e¤ort is less than 1=2
(the rst-best e¤ort) which conrms our expectations regarding strategy s.
Now consider d.
Lemma 3. 1) If b > 1, d is not feasible; 2) if b  1 and d is chosen
D = b (5)
An explanation for Lemma 3 is as follows. If b is larger than the maximal
rst-period earnings, setting the debt face value below that maximal level
of earnings is not su¢ cient to ensure that the investor is repaid at least
b. If debt face value is higher than the maximal rst-period earnings, the
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entrepreneur has nothing to gain and does not provide any e¤ort. Therefore,
if b > 1, the investment will not be undertaken. When b  1, the investment
takes place and Es e¤ort in this case is above the rst-best level. E loses
control of the rm if debt is not paid back to creditors. Hence he delivers
the level of e¤ort that provides higher than socially optimal probability of
the projects success in the rst period. He does this to make sure that he
stays on control of the rm.
Figure 1 illustrates intuitions behind Lemmas 2 and 3. In Figure 1a
e maximizes the di¤erence between rms value and Es cost of e¤ort and
e0 maximizes the di¤erence between Es payo¤ and Es cost of e¤ort. As
shown in Figure 1b when e = e, marginal increase in rms value equals
Es marginal cost of e¤ort and when e = e0, marginal increase in Es payo¤
equals Es marginal cost of e¤ort. Since Es marginal payo¤is less than rms
marginal value we have e0 < e. Analogously Figures 1c and 1d illustrate why
e00 > e.
-
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Figure 1. Optimal e¤ort under strategy s (a and b); d (c and d).
Proposition 1. 1) If the b  1=8, s is the optimal strategy. 2) If the
1=8 < b  1, d is optimal; 3) if the 1 < b, the project will not be undertaken.
The project will be undertaken if and only if b < 1. Thus, there is less
ine¢ ciency under small values of b than under high values of b. Given that
Es portion of total prot increases, E will provide a greater e¤ort when the
b is lower. Also, when b approaches zero, Es e¤ort approaches the rst-best
as follows from (4) and (3).10 The same does not happen with strategy d
because E is concerned about keeping the rms control and thus delivers
higher than optimal level of e¤ort even if debt face value is relatively small.
Consequently, s is the optimal strategy under small values of b. Finally, note
that Innes (1990) analyzes a similar environment (where the entrepreneurs
e¤ort is costly and EM is not allowed) with only one period (in terms of our
model this means v = 0) and demonstrates that debt is the best nancing
method.
10If b! 0 then k ! 0 and e! 1=2.
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4 Optimal contracting with earnings manip-
ulation
Now suppose that E can manipulate earnings. Es problem (P2) can be
written as follows:
maxs;dEVE subject to
a = argmaxa VE
e = argmaxeEVE
EVI  b
0  e  1
c  2  a  r0
As in the previous section, we begin by considering each nancing strategy
separately. In the case of strategy s, after observing latent earnings, E may
be interested in using EM by shifting earnings from the rst period to the
second period. The reason being a large opportunity "to steal" money from
future earnings of the rm given that they are di¢ cult to control by I. In
addition, E is not facing any risk of bankruptcy under strategy s. The trade-
o¤ for E will be between capturing benets in the second period and the
value loss caused by EM. The cost of EM has a signicant role to play here:
if it is su¢ ciently high, E will not be engaged in EM and vice versa.
Lemma 4. 1) s is feasible if and only if b  1=8 and
1 p1  8b
2
< c (6)
2) if s is chosen, the k is determined by (4).
As expected, the value of c is important for the results of Lemma 4. If it is
low, then E will be engaged in EM that will sharply reduce Is nal earnings.
To make strategy s a possible way of nancing, c must be su¢ ciently high.
Now consider strategy d. Intuitively, E may be interested in shifting EM
upward. This can be the case if latent earnings are low. Otherwise E loses
control of the rm and gets nothing in the second period. We also expect that
Es e¤ort can be more e¢ cient than in the case without EM. The opportunity
to manipulate earnings protects E against the risk of a low payo¤ when the
results of production are low. This provides an incentive for E to improve
e¤ort.
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Lemma 5. Consider strategy d. Let c  1. 1) If 2   c=2 < b, D = K,
where
K =
5  c p17 + c2   2c  8b
2
(7)
2) If 2   c=2 > b > 2   c, D = 2   c. 3) If 2   c > b, D = b. Now, let
c > 1. 1) If b > 2, d is not feasible; 2) If 2 > b > 1 + c=2, D = K; 3) If
1 + c=2 > b, D = 1.
The main result of Lemma 5 is that, in contrast to Lemma 3, debt -
nancing is possible even when b is relatively high. Without EM, a high b
would lead to a high debt face value which destroys Es incentive to provide
productive e¤ort. With the possibility of EM, E can make prot even if the
debt face value is large and current earnings are low.
To illustrate Lemma 5, consider the case when c = 1=2 and b < 1. Ac-
cording to Lemma 5, D = b in this case. Given the intermediate prot r0
and action a, Es payo¤ is:
0; if r0   a < D (8)
r0  D + 2; if r0   a  D and a = 0 (9)
r0  D + 2  c; if r0   a  D and a 6= 0 (10)
This means that if the rm defaults on its debt (r0   a < D), E gets
nothing. Otherwise, he gets the rms rst-period residual earnings plus the
rms going-concern value minus the cost of manipulation. Comparing (8)-
(10) for given values of c, b and D we get the following. If r0 = 1, a = 0
is optimal. If interim earnings are above the threshold, the optimal strategy
for E is not to manipulate earnings. Es payo¤ is 3   b by (9). If r0 = 0,
the optimal a satises a  r0  D and 2 + a  c  0. If these conditions are
satised, Es earnings remain the same regardless of a. Thus, for simplicity,
we will assume a = r0  D =  D. Es payo¤ is 3=2  b by (10). The choice
of e maximizes
e(3  b) + (1  e)(3=2  b)  e2 (11)
This means that, with probability e, E gets the current earnings of 1  b and
the rms going concern value 2 and with probability (1  e) he receives the
rms going concern value 2 reduced by the amount of EM b and the cost of
EM c = 1=2. The maximum of (11) is attained when e = 3=4. By (11), Es
expected payo¤ is 33=16  b in this case.
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Note that the level of e¤ort (e000 = 3=4) is closer to the rst-best level
(e = 1=2) than in the case without EM. Figure 2 illustrates this result. In
Figure 2a e maximizes the di¤erence between rms value and Es cost of
e¤ort; e00 maximizes the di¤erence between Es payo¤ and Es cost of e¤ort
in the case without EM; and e000 maximizes the di¤erence between Es payo¤
and Es cost of e¤ort with EM. The slope of the line describing Es expected
payo¤ (given by equation (11)) is less than that without EM (see (17)). As
shown in Figure 2b when e = e, marginal increase in rms value equals
Es marginal cost of e¤ort; when e = e00, marginal increase in Es payo¤
equals Es marginal cost of e¤ort in the case without EM; and when e = e000,
marginal increase in Es payo¤ equals Es marginal cost of e¤ort in the case
with EM. Since Es marginal payo¤ in the case with EM is less than in the
case without EM we have e000 < e00.
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Figure 2. Optimal e¤ort under strategy d with EM.
As was mentioned above, Es expected payo¤ is 33=16   b in this case.
This is higher than in the case without EM. It follows from Lemma 3 that,
for the case b < 1, it would be 2  b.
It follows from Lemma 5 that if b is relatively low and the cost of EM is
relatively low, debt is risk-free. The face value of debt is low and E is able to
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manipulate earnings to attain the threshold to avoid bankruptcy. If the b is
relatively large and the cost of EM is relatively high, debt is not feasible (EM
is not possible). Otherwise, E delivers some reasonable level of e¤ort which
implies some positive probability of default making debt risky. Lemmas 4
and 5 lead to the following proposition.
Proposition 2. If b  1=8, s is optimal if c > 1 
p
1 8b
2
and d is optimal
if c  1 
p
1 8b
2
. If 1=8 < b  2, d is optimal. If b > 2, d is optimal if c  1;
and the project will not be undertaken if c > 1.
Proposition 2 is intuitive. First, if b is large, s is not feasible - as discussed
in the case without EM. Thus, debt is the optimal nancing choice if the cost
of EM is low. For other values of b, we have the following. A low c is detri-
mental to s because it creates opportunities for E to engage in EM, thereby
shifting the rms value away from Is. d is almost always accompanied by
EM, so reducing the cost of EM is benecial for debt nancing.
Corollary 1 considers the e¤ect of changes in b on the optimal choice of
contract. It is shown that when the c is relatively small, rms with a high
b issue debt while rms with the same c but a lower b issue equity. If b is
relatively small, E will nance the project by issuing stock. The rms going
concern value will fully cover the investors investment. The entrepreneur
will keep 100% of current period earnings which will mitigate the moral
hazard problem. If b is large, then nancing in this way may not be feasible.
Therefore, debt becomes optimal.
Corollary 1. If 1 
p
1 8b
2
 c, d is optimal. If 1 
p
1 8b
2
< c  1, s is
optimal if b  1=8, and d is optimal if b > 1=8. If c > 1, s is optimal if
b  1=8, d is optimal if 1=8 < b  2, and no contract is feasible if b > 2.
Corollary 2. Earnings manipulation can appear in equilibrium. Earn-
ings manipulation is more probable as c decreases and b increases.
5 Can earnings manipulation enhance a rms
value?
Now we compare rms that are involved in EM (Section 4) with those that
are not (Section 3). If the amount of investment is large (b > 1), a rm
that does not manipulate earnings will not undertake projects with positive
value. In contrast, a rm that manipulates earnings will undertake the same
projects. If the amount of investment is low and EM is not possible, nancing
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with equity is optimal. If a rm can manipulate earnings, equity may still be
optimal. However, the cost of EM must be high - otherwise the entrepreneur
will "convert" current earnings into ine¢ cient long-term projects making the
issuance of equity unfeasible (ex-ante). In the latter case, debt becomes
optimal. This will usually be accompanied by EM: the entrepreneur will
try to achieve the threshold to avoid bankruptcy. It follows that there is
a trade-o¤ in social e¢ ciency between the benets from EM improving the
entrepreneurs e¤ort and the costs of EM.
Proposition 3. If 1 < b  2, rms that manipulate earnings have a
higher value than rms that do not : Otherwise, rms that manipulate earn-
ings have a higher value if and only if the cost of manipulation is low.
6 Risk-averse entrepreneur
Since E is risk-neutral in the basic model, usual trade-o¤ between incentives
and risk-sharing does not arise. This section analyzes the case when E is
risk-averse. Intuitively, for the case without EM the main ideas should hold.
Under strategy s, Es marginal payo¤ is still below the rms marginal value
because of impossibility to benet entirely from the results of his e¤ort and
also because of disutility from risk aversion. So, Es choice of e¤ort is below
the rst-best level. Under strategy d, Es marginal benet is greater than
the rms marginal value because E loses too much if short-term earnings
are low. This e¤ect will be multiplied by Es risk aversion. The optimal level
of e¤ort will higher than the rst-best level. When EM is allowed, Es level
of e¤ort should be closer to the rst best. This is analogous to the main
result in the basic model. However, if the degree of risk-aversion is too high
E might prefer to not to decrease the level of e¤ort in order to minimize of
risk of bankruptcy to minimum. This makes a di¤erence with the case when
E is risk-neutral. Below we develop these insights.
Suppose, Es expected utility is given by EuEVE = EVE V arVE,   0.
The case  = 0 corresponds to one in the basic model. Consider the case
 > 0. Lemma 3 holds. Indeed, Es choice of e maximizes EVE   V arVE.
VE = r0 D+2  e2 if r0 = 1 and VE = 0  e2 otherwise. Thus the expected
value and variance of VE is
EVE = e(3 D)  e2
V arVE = (3 D)2e(1  e)
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Es choice of e maximizes e(3 D) e2 (3 D)2e(1 e). The maximand of
this expression is e00 = 3 D (3 D)
2
2 2(3 D)2 . Since D  1 (otherwise E gets nothing)
and  > 0 we have e00 > 1 which implies e = 1. Is payo¤ is D. Therefore,
when D = b it is optimal. This only works if 1  b. If 1 < b and D  1, Is
payo¤ is not su¢ cient to cover the initial investment. If D > 1, E provides
no e¤ort since he gets a payo¤ of zero and thus I gets nothing.
To illustrate Lemma 5, consider the case when c = 1=2 and b < 1. Ac-
cording to Lemma 5, D = b in this case. Making similarly to the case with
risk-neutral E on p. 10 we get that if r0 = 1, a = 0 is optimal. If interim
earnings are above the threshold, the optimal strategy for E is not to ma-
nipulate earnings. Es payo¤ is 3   b. If r0 = 0, the optimal a =  D. Es
payo¤ is 3=2  b. We thus have:
EVE = e(3  b) + (1  e)(3=2  b)  e2
V arVE = 9=4e(1  e)
The choice of e maximizes
e(3  b) + (1  e)(3=2  b)  e2   9=4e(1  e) (12)
The maximum of (12) is attained when eav = 3=2 9=4
2 9=2 . Comparing e
av with
the level of e¤ort without EM e000 we nd that if  is su¢ ciently small ( <
2=9), eav is closer to the rst-best level (e = 1=2) than in the case without
EM. Otherwise, there is no di¤erence. So in order for our main result to
hold, the degree of risk aversion should not be too high.
7 Model discussion
Suppose that it is possible to write an enforceable contract contingent on the
rms total value. Then, for any contract found in Section 4 there exists an
alternative contract contingent on the rms total value that will provide E
with a higher payo¤. To illustrate this, consider the case c < 1 and b < 2 c.
If a rm can engage in EM, the optimal contract is analogous to the one
described in Proposition 2. Es e¤ort is e = 1=2 and the parties expected
payo¤s are:
EVE = 9=4  b  c (13)
and EVI = b. D = b is optimal. E manipulates earnings regardless of r0.
When r0 = 0 he receives 2  b  c and when r0 = 1 he receives 3  b  c. Now
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suppose the parties write a contract where E gets 2   b if the rms total
value is 2 or less and 3   b if the rms total value is greater than 2. The
optimal e¤ort maximizes Es expected payo¤ e(3  b) + (1  e)(2  b)  e2.
e = 1=2 is optimal. Also, a = 0 because any a > 0 will only reduce the rms
total value. Es expected payo¤ is 9=4   b which is greater than (13). Is
expected payo¤ is 1=2(3  (3  b))+1=2(2  (2  b)) = b. Therefore, we have
a better contract which does not involve EM.
Now suppose that in addition to using pure equity or pure debt nancing
the rm can use mixed nancing. In this case, the main idea holds. Under
any nancing the entrepreneurs e¤ort in the scenario without EM will be
above the rst-best level (similar to pure debt nancing result). To see this
note that Es choice of e maximizes EVE, where VE = (1 k)(r0 D)+2 e2,
if r0 = 1 and VE = 0   e2 otherwise (the k denotes the fraction of equity
belonging to the investor). Thus, EVE = e((1   k)(1   D) + 2)   e2. The
maximand of this expression is e00 = (1 k)(1 D)+2
2
. We have e00 > 1 which
implies e = 1. An opportunity to manipulate earnings can optimize the
entrepreneurs e¤ort like in the case with pure debt nancing.
Further suppose that the rm can issue convertible debt. This is similar
to standard debt described in the model except that I can purchase a fraction
of the rms shares when it is solvent. However, since E remains in control,
he will cream-o¤ the rms going concern value. Hence, the modeling is
similar to standard debt.
Long-term debt is not considered in the basic model (in the spirit of
incomplete contract literature) because it cannot be enforced. Since the
creditors do not have property rights on the remaining assets, the owners
will capture the rms entire going-concern value.
One can make additional assumptions about the rst and second period
sharing rules based on a continuous earnings distribution function or di¤erent
control shifting scenarios. These scenarios may yield some new results. For
instance, one can assume that E can capture only a fraction of the rms
going concern value. In this case, the set of possible nancing strategies can
be signicantly larger than in the basic set-up. However, the main idea that
EM can improve productive e¤ort will not be a¤ected given that one keeps
the assumption about contract incompleteness.
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8 Empirical evidence and policy implications
We have shown that EM can be a part of the equilibrium relationship between
rmsinsiders and outsiders. This holds even if the cost of EM is relatively
high (as follows from Proposition 2). Investors accept some degree of EM
because this increases the insidersincentive to provide a high level productive
e¤ort.
From Proposition 3, if the cost of EM is relatively low, EM can be so-
cially e¢ cient. EM can enhance a rms value when compared to the case
without EM. If the cost of EM is relatively high, the opportunity to engage
in EM either does not a¤ect rms values (when they do not use EM in
equilibrium) or is detrimental to rmsvalues (when rms engage in EM in
equilibrium). Some recent evidence in the study by Jiraporn et al (2008) is
consistent with this prediction although they are not specically focused on
real manipulations. So additional research is required here.
EM should more frequently be observed in industries characterized by
incomplete contracts. If complete contracts can be written, the parties can
write a contract contingent on the rms overall earnings which eliminates
the possibility of EM. Thus, rms in industries which are characterized by a
high degree of technological or market uncertainty (such as software, internet,
biomedical etc.) are more likely to be engaged in EM.
As implied by Corollary 2, EM should more frequently be observed among
less protable rms (high b). This prediction is consistent with Burgstahler
and Dichev (1997).
Firms which manipulate earnings issue more debt (Lemmas 4 and 5).
This is consistent with Richardson, Tuna and Wu (2002) and Hodgson and
Stevenson-Clarke (2000) where rms which have excessive debt are more
likely to be involved in EM.
It follows from Corollary 1 that rms with a higher b (and lower prof-
itability respectively) issue debt more often than rms with a lower b. This
is consistent with a very important corporate nance phenomenon: the neg-
ative correlation between debt and protability (see, among others, Titman
and Wessels (1988), and Rajan and Zingales (1995)).
According to our analysis in Section 7, EM should more frequently be
observed for cases when the degree of Es risk aversion is not too large. This
is consistent with previous results in Degeorge et al (1998).
Since EM can be socially e¢ cient, the question of its regulation depends
on the industry and any parameters related to the rms projects. If the
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cost of EM is relatively low, putting in place an expensive public system
of EM prevention cannot be e¢ cient: entrepreneurs will invest less funds
in socially e¢ cient projects and will not provide high levels of productive
e¤ort. According to our analysis (proof of Proposition 3), such a system
should target average-prot rms (when the cost of EM is relatively high) or
high-prot rms (when the cost of EM is in the intermediate range).
9 Conclusion
Graham et al (2005) pointed out that EM through real actions has been used
more often than accounting manipulation and misreporting. Existing litera-
ture usually considers EM to be a negative social phenomenon and suggests
measures for its elimination. In the present paper, we argue that a zero tol-
erance policy towards EM may be socially ine¢ cient. We analyze a model
where an entrepreneur needs external nancing for a protable investment
project and his productive e¤ort is not observable by outsiders. The security
design should provide the entrepreneur with the optimal incentive to provide
productive e¤ort. The equilibrium level of e¤ort is not socially optimal and
in some cases, the entrepreneur does not undertake socially e¢ cient projects.
Following this, we analyze the case where in addition to productive e¤ort the
entrepreneur can be engaged in EM that reduces the rms total value. EM
consists of transferring cash ow between periods. Our main nding is that
the existence of EM can lead to increased output (including the entrepre-
neurs e¤ort and the amount of investment) and therefore, improved social
e¢ ciency. It is shown that EM should be observed more often among rms
with low protability, low costs of EM, and extensive debt nancing. A pub-
lic system of EM prevention should target average-prot rms (when the cost
of EM is relatively high) or high-prot rms (when the cost of EM is in the
intermediate range). These insights hold for industries characterized by a
high degree of contract incompleteness.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose in contrast
that the solution of the game is such that in some situations a 6= 0. The rm
issued a security which pays VI(r; v) to I. This means that if the rst-period
earnings equal r and the second-period earnings equal v, I gets VI(r; v). Also
assume that E chooses the level of e¤ort ec and when r0 = 0, E chooses a0
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and when r0 = 1, E chooses a1. By assumption either a0 or a1 or both di¤er
from 0.
The parties expected payo¤s are EVE and EVI . When r0 = 0, I receives
VI( a0; 2+ a0) and when r0 = 1 he receives VI(1  a1; 2+ a1). When r0 = 0,
E receives x = 2   VI(r   a0; v + a0)   L0 and when r0 = 1 he receives
y = 2   VI(1   a1; 2 + a1)   L1, where L0 = c if a0 6= 0 and 0 otherwise;
L1 = c if a1 6= 0 and 0 otherwise. The optimal e¤ort e maximizes Es
expected payo¤ ey+(1  e)x  e2. Now suppose the parties write a contract
where I gets VI( a0; 2 + a0) + L0   ", " > 0 if the rms total value is 2
or less and VI(1   a1; 2 + a1) + L1   " if the rms total value is greater
than 2. a = 0 because any a > 0 will only reduce the rms total value
and the payment to E. The optimal e¤ort maximizes Es expected payo¤
ey + (1   e)x + "   e2. Thus e = ec is optimal. Es expected payo¤ is
higher by " and Is expected payo¤ is greater than under initial contract if
" is su¢ ciently small. Therefore, we have a better contract which does not
involve EM. So an equilibrium contract with EM does not exist. End proof.
Proof of Lemma 2. If s was chosen, EVE = E[(1   k)r + 2   e2] =
(1  k)e+ 2  e2. Hence the optimal level of e¤ort is
e0 = (1  k)=2 (14)
This is below the rst-best level of e¤ort: E gets only a fraction of the rms
prot but absorbs all the costs. Is expected payo¤ is
EVI = E[kr] = ke = k(1  k)=2 (15)
The optimal k maximizes Es expected payo¤, EVE, under the condition that
EVI is not less than b. From (14) we get:
EVE = (1  k)2=4 + 2 (16)
From (15), Is payo¤ is maximized when k = 1=2 which implies that maximal
possible EVI is equal to 1=8. Thus, strategy s is feasible only if b  1=8.
Since from (16), Es payo¤ is decreasing in k, the optimal k can be found by
equalizing (15) and b which produces (4). End proof.
Proof of Lemma 3. Es choice of e maximizes EVE. VE = r0 D+2  e2
if r0 = 1 and VE = 0  e2 otherwise. Thus
EVE = e(3 D)  e2 (17)
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The maximand of this expression is e00 = 3 D
2
. However, since D  1 (oth-
erwise E gets nothing) we have e00 > 1 which implies e = 1. Is payo¤ is D.
Therefore, when D = b it is optimal. This only works if 1  b. If 1 < b and
D  1, Is payo¤ is not su¢ cient to cover the initial investment. If D > 1,
E provides no e¤ort since he gets a payo¤ of zero and thus I gets nothing.
End proof.
Proof of Proposition 1. From Lemma 2, if s is chosen, b  1=8 and Es
expected payo¤ is
EVE =
17 +
p
1  8b  4b
8
(18)
If d is chosen, b  1 and
EVE = 2  b (19)
Proposition 1 follows from comparing (18)-(19) for di¤erent values of b. End
proof.
Proof of Lemma 4. Consider strategy s. Given the intermediate prot r0
and action a, Es payo¤ is:
(1  k)r0 + 2; if a = 0 (20)
(1  k)(r0   a) + 2 + a  c; if a 6= 0 (21)
Let  be the di¤erence between (20) and (21). We have  = c   ka. If
r0 = 0, then, from (1), a  0. Thus  > 0 and a = 0 is optimal. E will
not increase current earnings since he receives the rms total going concern
value and only a part of the rms current earnings. If r0 = 1, then, from (1),
a  1. (21) is maximized when a = r0 and it equals 3  c. Also (20) equals
3 k. Thus, if k < c, a = 0 is optimal. If k > c, the optimal a = r0 (when the
cost of EM is relatively low, E will increase the rms going concern value).
(If E is indi¤erent between a = 0 and a = r0, he chooses a = 0. It happens
if k = c)
If strategy s is chosen, Is payo¤ is kr. If k > c, then it follows from the
above paragraph that Is payo¤ is 0 (this cannot be an equilibrium outcome).
If
k < c (22)
E does not manipulate earnings regardless of r0. Es expected payo¤ thus
is e(3   k) + (1   e)2   e2 (i.e. with probability e, r0 = 1 and E gets
(1   k)r0 + 2 = 3   k and with probability of 1   e, r0 = 0 and E gets 2).
Es payo¤ is maximized when e = (1   k)=2. Analogously to Lemma 2, we
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nd that this only works if b  1=8 and the optimal k is given by (4). From
(4) and (22), this contract only works if the condition (6) holds. End proof.
Proof of Lemma 5. Similarly to (8)-(10) we get the following. If r0  D,
a = 0 is optimal. The same holds if r0 < D and 2 + r0   D   c < 0.
Otherwise, the optimal a satises a  r0   D. If this condition is satised,
Es earnings remain the same regardless of a. Thus, for simplicity, we will
assume a = r0  D. Finally, we have:
a = 0 if either r0  D or r0 < D and 2 + r0  D   c < 0
a = r0  D, if r0 < D and 2 + r0  D   c  0 (23)
We consider the case c < 1 and b < 1. The proof for other cases is
similar and it is available upon demand. First, consider the choices of a and
e. Three situations are possible. Suppose that 2   c  D > 1. By (23), in
this case a = r0 D, 8r0. E chooses e which maximizes his expected payo¤:
e(3 D   c) + (1  e)(2 D   c)  e2. Thus, e = 1=2 and
EVI = D: (24)
Now consider 2   D   c < 0. Again by (23), a = D   1 if r0 = 1 and
a = 0 if r0 = 0. The choice of e maximizes e(3 D   c)  e2. Thus,
e = e00 if 3 D   c > 0 (25)
e = 0 if 3 D   c  0
where e00 = (3   D   c)=2 (note that e00 < 1 because 2 > 3   D   c). The
case e = 0 is not interesting because Es payo¤ is 0 and thus debt is never
the optimal contract. In the rst case, Is payo¤ is
(3 D   c)D=2 + ( 1 +D + c) (26)
EVE = (3 D   c)2=4 (27)
If 1  D (and 2 D  c > 0 because c < 1), by (23), a = D if r0 = 0 and
a = 0 if r0 = 1. The choice of e maximizes e(3 D)+ (1  e)(2 D  c)  e2.
Thus, e = (1 + c)=2. Therefore,
EVI = D: (28)
Now we turn to the analysis of the choice of optimal contract.
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Three di¤erent situations are possible depending on the magnitude of D.
Consider
2 D   c  0 (29)
1 < D (30)
By (23), (29) and (30), a = r0  D, 8r0. This means that E will manipulate
earnings regardless of r0 (the condition (30) implies that even if the rm
performs well, the interim earnings are below the debt face value; and (29)
ensures that the going-concern value is high enough to allow an increase in
rst-period earnings to repay debt even if the r0 = 0). The choice of e
maximizes Es expected payo¤: e(3 D  c)+ (1  e)(2 D  c)  e2. Thus,
e = 1=2 and
EVE = 5=4  "  c (31)
where " = D   1 > 0. Is payo¤ is D.
Now consider the case when 1  D (and 2  D   c > 0 because c < 1).
Here, the rm is solvent if r0 = 1, and E can increase rst-period earnings
to avoid bankruptcy if r0 = 0. The choice of e maximizes e(3   D) + (1  
e)(2   D   c)   e2. Thus, e = (1 + c)=2. Is payo¤ is D. Since Es payo¤
decreases in D, optimal D = b.
EVE = 9=4  b  c=2 + c2=4 (32)
Finally, consider
2  c D < 0 (33)
By (23) and (33) we have, a = r0   D if r0 = 1, and a = 0 if r0 = 0. The
choice of e maximizes
e(3 D   c)  e2 (34)
This means that, with probability e, E gets the current earnings of 0 and
the rms going concern value 2 reduced by the amount of EM (D   1) and
the cost of EM. The maximand of (34) is e00 = (3 D   c)=2. Thus,
e = e00 if 3 D   c  0 (35)
e = 0 if 3 D   c < 0
(Note that e00 < 1 because 2 > 3   D   c). The case e = 0 is not relevant
because Es payo¤ is 0 (recall that a = 0 if r0 = 0) and thus debt is never
the optimal contract. Is expected payo¤ is
EVI = (3 D   c)D=2 + ( 1 +D + c) (36)
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This means that debt holders receive D (when r0 = 1) with probability e00
and they receive the rms going concern value 2 with probability 1   e00 =
( 1 +D + c)=2 (when r0 = 0). From (34),
EVE = (3 D   c)2=4 = (1  )2=4 (37)
where  = D   2 + c > 0.
Comparing (31), (32), and (37) we nd that if c < 1 and b < 1, D = b is
optimal. Es expected payo¤ is 9=4  b  c=2 + c2=4. End proof.
Proof of Proposition 2. Consider b  1=8. Suppose c > 1. If s is
chosen, Es payo¤ is 17+
p
1 8b 4b
8
by (18) and Lemma 4. If d is chosen, Es
payo¤ is (2  c)2=4 (see the proof of Lemma 5). The former is not less than
33=16 (this value is attained when b = 1=8) and the latter is not greater
than 1=2 (this value is attained when c = 0). Thus, s is optimal. Consider
1 p1 8b
2
< c  1. If s is chosen, Es payo¤ is 17+
p
1 8b 4b
8
. If d is chosen, Es
payo¤ is 9=4  b  c=2+ c2=4. Again, the payo¤ from s is higher. To see this,
note that the payo¤ from d decreases in c. When c = 1 
p
1 8b
2
, the payo¤
from s is still larger. Thus, it is also larger under other values of c. Consider
1 p1 8b
2
 c. s is not feasible, d is feasible and thus is optimal.
Consider 1=8 < b  2. s is not feasible. d is feasible and thus is optimal.
Consider 2 < b. s is not feasible. If c > 1, no contract is feasible. If
c  1, d is feasible and thus is optimal. End proof.
Proof of Corollary 1. Follows directly from Proposition 2. End proof.
Proof of Corollary 2. From Proposition 2, if, for instance, c < 1 and
b > 2   c, the equilibrium outcome is nancing by debt and, if r0 = 1, the
rm will manipulate earnings. Also, from Proposition 2, for a given b, debt
nancing is optimal when c is relatively low. In most cases, debt nancing, in
contrast to equity nancing, will be accompanied by earnings manipulation
(see the proof of Lemma 5). From Corollary 1, the same holds for high values
of b. End proof.
Proof of Proposition 3. Let VEM denote the value of rms that can manip-
ulate earnings and let VN denote the value of rms that cannot manipulate
earnings. As follows from Proposition 1, if b > 1 and earnings manipulation
is not allowed, the rm does not invest and thus VN = 0. According to
Proposition 2, if 1 < b  2 or if b > 2 and c < 1, rms that can engage
in EM will use debt nancing and invest in the project. The value of these
rms will be positive. Consider 1=8 < b  1. According to Proposition 1,
VN = 2  b. If c  1, VEM = 9=4  b  c=2 + c2=4 (from the proof of Propo-
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sition 2). This expression decreases in c when c  1. The minimal value,
2  b, is attained when c = 1. Therefore, the value of rms that can engage
in EM is greater than or equal to the value of rms that are not involved
in EM. If c > 1, VEM = (2   c)2=4. This is less than 2   b. Therefore,
rms that do not manipulate earnings have a higher value. If 1=8  b, VN =
17+
p
1 8b 4b
8
. If c > 1 
p
1 8b
2
, rms that manipulate earnings have the same
value as rms that do not. If c  1 
p
1 8b
2
, VEM = 9=4  b  c=2+ c2=4. Con-
sider  = VEM   VN . This expression decreases in c. When c = 0,  > 0.
When c = 1 
p
1 8b
2
,  < 0. The proposition follows from the continuity of 
in c. End proof.
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